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Abstract
The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual
obligations contains several provisions aimed explicitly at the
protection of ‘weaker’ contracting parties, such as consum-
ers and employees. However, in addition to this, the inter-
ests of weaker parties are sometimes also safeguarded
through the application of ‘overriding mandatory provi-
sions’, which are superimposed on the law applicable to the
contract to protect a fundamental interest of a Member
State. This article is an attempt to clarify the extent to which
the concept of overriding mandatory provisions may serve
as a vehicle for weaker party protection. To do this, it exam-
ines the definition and limitations of the concept and its
relation to conflict of laws rules based on the protective
principle. Finally, the article seeks to establish whether the
doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions remains rele-
vant in the case of harmonisation of substantive law at the
EU level, for which it will differentiate between full and min-
imum harmonisation.
Keywords: overriding mandatory rules, Rome I Regulation,
weaker party protection, minimum harmonisation, Consum-
er Rights Directive
1 Introduction
European private international law,1 like substantive
law, contains specific rules that aim to protect contract-
ing parties that are usually considered to be the ‘weaker
party’, such as consumers and employees. In general,
protection is provided in two ways: by establishing an
‘objective’ rule favouring the weaker party and by
restricting party autonomy. In the field of international
jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation2 and its
successor, the Brussels Ibis Regulation,3 contain special
* Assistant professor in the Department of Private International and Com-
parative Law at the Erasmus School of Law. The author would like to
thank the reviewers for their comments.
1. In this article, Private International Law is to be understood as covering
conflict of laws, international jurisdiction, and recognition and enforce-
ment.
2. Council Regulation 44/2001, OJ 2001 L 12/1.
3. Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
OJ 2012 L351/1.
provisions that determine the court of the weaker par-
ty’s residence or – in the case of employees – habitual
workplace has jurisdiction and set limitations on free
choice of forum.4 In the area of conflict of laws (here-
after COL), similar mechanisms are used: for instance,
the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contrac-
tual obligations5 includes several COL rules referring to
the law of the weaker party’s habitual residence or work-
ing place, as well as provisions imposing restrictions on
free choice of law.6
In addition to the special rules aimed at the protection
of weaker parties, such as consumers, employees, and
– to a lesser extent – passengers and insurance policy-
holders, the Rome I Regulation encompasses several
potential vehicles for the safeguarding of these interests.
These include Arts. 3(3) and 3(4), which limit free
choice of law – the main cornerstone of the Rome I Reg-
ulation – for purely national and intra-EU situations in
order to counteract an evasion of mandatory national or
EU law, including substantive provisions based on the
protective principle. Moreover, the Rome I Regulation
has two general correction mechanisms that might come
into play: the public policy exception and the doctrine
of overriding mandatory rules. The function of the pub-
lic policy exception is to negate foreign law, which is
manifestly incompatible with fundamental principles of
the forum.7 Overriding mandatory rules are superim-
posed on the law applicable to the contract to protect an
interest that is regarded as fundamental by – usual-
ly – the forum state. Out of the two mechanisms, the
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules appears to play a
more prominent part in the protection of weaker parties.
However, the nature of its exact role needs further clari-
fication.
This article will examine to what extent the doctrine of
overriding mandatory rules can serve as a vehicle for the
protection of weaker parties. For this, the following
issues will be addressed: the definition of the concept of
4. See Arts. 8-21 Brussels I Regulation and Arts. 10-23 Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation.
5. Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
OJ 2008 L 177/6.
6. See below, Section 3.1.
7. Th.M. de Boer, ‘Unwelcome Foreign Law: Public Policy and Other
Means to Protect the Fundamental Values and Public Interests of the
European Community’, in A. Malatesta et al. (eds.), The External
Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession
Matters (2008) 295, at 296.
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overriding mandatory rules (Section 2), its relationship
with the special protective provisions of Arts. 6 and 8
Rome I (Section 3), its relationship with the ‘localising
rules’ incorporated in European Directives (Section 4),
and the extent to which the doctrine remains relevant in
the case of harmonisation of substantive law at the EU
level (Section 5). Finally, Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Doctrine of Overriding
Mandatory Rules
2.1 Definition According to the Rome I
Regulation
The doctrine of overriding mandatory rules can be
traced back to German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savig-
ny (1779-1861). In the 19th century, he developed a new
approach to determine the applicable law in an interna-
tional situation.8 Instead of unilateral rules that deter-
mined the scope of application of a national rule but
remain silent on the applicability of foreign law, he
introduced multilateral COL rules. According to von
Savigny, legal relationships must be allocated to a legal
system, which can be the legal system of the forum
country but can also be a foreign one. He established
categories of legal relationships, such as obligations and
property, and designed COL rules that link these cate-
gories to a particular jurisdiction through objective con-
necting factors, such as the location of the property or
the place of performance of a contractual obligation.
Though decisional harmony and neutralism were at the
heart of his theory, von Savigny allowed a limited
exception in favour of unilateralism, by means of the
application of ‘strictly positive mandatory rules’ of the
lex fori, but at the same time argued that this exception
would eventually disappear.9
Nevertheless, together with the public policy exception,
the doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions has
retained its function as a general correction mechanism
in contemporary European COL. In the Rome I Regula-
tion, overriding mandatory rules are regulated in Art. 9.
Contrary to Art. 7 of its predecessor, the Rome Conven-
tion, Art. 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation provides for a
definition:
Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country
for safeguarding its public interests, such as its politi-
cal, social or economic organisation, to such an extent
that they are applicable to any situation falling within
their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applica-
ble to the contract under this Regulation.
8. F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Band VIII,
Berlin (1849).
9. Ibid., at 36.
This description aligns with the meaning given by the
Court of Justice in the Arblade case.10 What becomes
clear from the definition is that overriding mandatory
provisions are not just mandatory provisions. Unlike
‘ordinary’ mandatory provisions, their application can-
not be circumvented by a choice for the law of another
country. In other words, these provisions are interna-
tionally binding. They are also to be distinguished from
the ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment’, as mentioned in Arts. 3(3) and (4) as well as in
6(2) and 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation. Not only are
overriding mandatory rules enforceable irrespective of a
choice of law by the parties; they also supersede the law
applicable on the basis of the objective COL rules of the
Regulation. After all, their application is dependent
solely on the question of whether or not the situation
falls within the scope of the provision.
The definition given in Art. 9(1) does not resolve all
uncertainties that have arisen under Art. 7 of the Rome
Convention. With regard to the provision, the article
states: ‘the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a
country for safeguarding its public interests.’ This raises
several questions. For instance, what is meant by ‘cru-
cial’? How should this be determined? The European
legislature seems to afford a wide margin of appreciation
to the courts.11 In addition, it is not entirely clear what
kinds of public interests are being targeted. The article
itself mentions the state’s political, social, or economic
organisation, but this list is not exhaustive, since the
European legislature included the words ‘such as’. Con-
troversy has existed for some time regarding the matter
of how ‘public interest’ should be interpreted. Does it
exclude provisions that protect weaker parties? This
issue will be discussed in Section 2.3. Another question
concerns interpretation of the words ‘by a country’.
Does it mean that the provision in question should only
aim at protecting national public interests, or can a rule
protecting a European public interest, such as the free
movement of goods and free and undistorted competi-
tion, also qualify as an overriding mandatory
provision?12 A strong argument in favour of the latter
view is that – insofar as it would be possible to distin-
guish between ‘national’ and ‘European’ interests – the
Member States are, in any case, obliged to secure the
10. Joined Cases C-396/96 and C-376/96, Arblade [1999] ECR I, at 8453,
Rec. 30. The court states: ‘[…] that term must be understood as apply-
ing to national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to
be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order
in the Member State concerned as to require compliance there with by
all persons present on the national territory of that Member State and
all legal relationships within that State’. This decision can in its turn be
viewed as an affirmation of the definition by Francescakis; see Ph. Fran-
cescakis, Répertoire de droit international 1 (1968), at 480.
11. See also J.J. Kuipers, EU Law and Private International Law. The Inter-
relationship in Contractual Obligations (2012), at 71.
12. Kuipers, above n. 11, at 72; Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private
and Private International Law, ‘Comments on the European Commis-
sion’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I)’, 71
RabelsZ 225, at 316 (2007).
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interests of the European Union as if they were their
own.13
2.2 Limitations Set by CJEU
In Unamar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare,14 the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) laid down cer-
tain limitations with respect to the concept of overriding
mandatory rules.
The facts of this case were the following. In 2005,
Unamar NV, a company incorporated in Belgium,
and the Bulgarian company NMB concluded a
commercial agency agreement, according to which
Unamar would act as an agent in relation to the oper-
ation of NMB’s container liner shipping service. The
one-year agreement contained a choice of law clause
for Bulgarian law and an arbitration clause for the
arbitration chamber of the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry in Sofia (Bulgaria). The agreement was
renewed annually until the end of 2008, when NMB
terminated the contract. Unamar brought proceed-
ings before the Antwerp Commercial Court and
ordered compensation. NMB contested the juris-
diction of the court, since parties had included an
arbitration clause in the contract. However, the Bel-
gian court ruled that it was competent to hear the
case. It also ruled that, notwithstanding the choice for
Bulgarian law, Art. 27 of the Belgian law on commer-
cial agency contracts had to be applied as an ‘overrid-
ing mandatory rule’. The Antwerp Court of Appeal
declared that the arbitration clause was valid and that
the Antwerp court had no jurisdiction. It also ruled
that the provisions of the Belgian law on commercial
agency contracts could not be qualified as overriding
mandatory provisions. Moreover, the Court of
Appeal held that, since Bulgaria also implemented
the EU Agency Directive, establishing minimum
standards for the protection of agents, Unamar
received sufficient protection on the basis of the
chosen law, even though Bulgarian law provided less
protection than Belgian law. Unamar brought an
appeal in cassation, and the Court of Cassation
requested a preliminary ruling by the CJEU, asking
whether the Belgian provisions exceeding the scope
and the level of protection of the Agency Directive
could be applied as overriding mandatory provisions
of the lex fori within the meaning of Art. 7(2) of the
Rome Convention, even if the law applicable to the
contract was the law of an EU Member State in
which the minimum protection provided by the
Agency Directive had been implemented.15
In order to answer the question referred to by the
Belgian Court of Cassation, the CJEU had to give its
opinion on the concept of overriding mandatory rules. It
makes reference to the Arblade case and Art. 9(1) of the
13. See de Boer (2008), above n. 7, at 316; R. Plender and M. Wilderspin,
Private International Law on Obligations (2009), at 357.
14. Case C184/12 (not yet published in ECR).
15. Ibid., Rec. 26.
Rome I Regulation, even though this Regulation is tem-
porally not applicable to the dispute. In addition, the
CJEU imposes two restrictions with regard to giving
effect to overriding mandatory rules. The first one is
based on the provisions of the EU Treaty, in particular
the four freedoms. According to the CJEU, the applica-
tion of national rules shall not be detrimental to the pri-
macy and uniform application of EU law.16
The second restriction is to be found in Recital 49 of the
judgement, in which the CJEU states that, in order to
secure the effect of the fundamental principle of
freedom of contract, the term ‘overriding mandatory
provisions’ should be interpreted strictly. Here, the
CJEU pays explicit attention to the relationship between
overriding mandatory provisions and party autonomy,
the latter being the cornerstone of the Rome Convention
and Rome I Regulation. It refuses, however, to draw
radical conclusions. It follows from the judgement in
Unamar that the national legislatures and courts still
have a relatively large margin of appreciation and can
even designate a mandatory rule as being ‘overriding’ if
that rule is based on a minimum harmonisation
Directive but exceeds the protection required by the
Directive.17 This issue will be considered in more detail
in Section 5.
2.3 Public Interest in Protecting Individuals
According to Art. 9(1), respect for overriding mandato-
ry rules should be considered crucial by a state for ‘safe-
guarding its public interests’. Does this imply that rules
aiming at the protection of individual interests cannot
be regarded as overriding mandatory provisions? The
legislative history of the Rome I Regulation provides no
clarity on this matter.18 According to the German
Supreme Court19 and to the majority opinion in the
German literature, the answer is affirmative.20 In order
to qualify as an overriding mandatory provision, a rule
should at least partly pursue a state interest, and the
protection of this state interest should not simply be
16. Ibid., Rec. 46. See more details regarding the limitations that EU pri-
mary law imposes on the application of overriding mandatory rules; J.
Fetsch, Eingriffsnormen und EG-Vertrag (2002), at 126 ff. In the Ger-
man literature, it has been argued that application of the overriding
mandatory rules should not only be in conformity with the four free-
doms, but should also comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union. Lüttringhaus claims that in respect of Art. 9(1)
of the Rome I Regulation, Art. 16 of the Charter – the freedom to con-
duct a business – is particularly relevant, since this provision encompass-
es freedom of contract; see J.D. Lüttringhaus, ‘Eingriffsnormen in inter-
nationalen Unionsprivat- und Prozessrecht: Von Ingmar zu Unamar’,
IPRax 146, at 149 (2014). Although this freedom is not absolute and
can be restricted, these restrictions should not be disproportionate in
the sense that they affect its essence; see Case C-426/11, Alemo-Her-
ron v. Parkwood (not yet published in ECR), Rec. 35.
17. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 50.
18. It should be noted that the Giuliano/Lagarde report on the Rome Con-
vention (OJ 1980 C 282/28) does mention rules on consumer protec-
tion as an example of overriding mandatory rules.
19. Bundesgerichtshof 13 December 2005 (Case I ZR 82/05).
20. D. Martiny, ‘Art. 9’, Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch, Band 10 – VO (EG) 593/2008, at 13 (2010); P. Hauser,
Eingriffsnormen in der Rom I-Verordnung (2012), at 9-10; A. Köhler,
Eingriffsnorme – Der 'Unfertige Teil' des europäischen IPR (2013), at
23.
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ancillary to the purpose of protection of an individual
interest.21 With regard to consumer protection rules,
from the German Supreme Court’s case law, it follows
that the special rule for consumer contracts in Art. 6 of
the Rome I Regulation is given precedence over Art. 9.22
However, in other countries, such as the United
Kingdom and France, it is thought that provisions
aimed at protecting individual interests, such as con-
sumers or employees, can be regarded as overriding
mandatory rules.23 Although these provisions do not
serve a specific public interest, it is reasoned that a
Member State can nevertheless have an interest in
applying provisions based on public policy considera-
tions, since the abuse of weaker parties can be viewed as
a threat for civil society.24 For this reason, the applica-
tion of the rule itself is of public interest.25 Examples of
these ‘secondary generation’ or ‘semi-public’ overriding
mandatory provisions are in Section 27(2) of the English
Unfair Contract Terms Act26 and in certain articles of
the French loi sur le crédit à la consommation.27
In the Netherlands, according to the majority opinion in
the literature, provisions aimed primarily at the protec-
tion of weaker parties can be applied as overriding man-
datory rules.28 Moreover, the purpose of a rule can
change over time. This is true of Art. 6 of the Dutch
Labour Relations Decree (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeids-
verhoudingen), established in 1945, and with the primary
goal of protecting the interests of the Dutch labour mar-
ket. In Nuon v. Olbrych,29 the Dutch Supreme Court
ruled that currently the protection of the employee
against wrongful dismissal is given prominence. In pre-
vious case law, the key question was whether at the time
of dismissal it was foreseeable that the employee would
fall back on the Dutch labour market. However, in this
case the Supreme Court stated that the applicability of
the provision depended on whether the situation of this
employee could be distinguished sufficiently from the
situations of other employees working in the Nether-
lands and who were undoubtedly entitled to protection.
Until now, the CJEU has not addressed explicitly the
issue as to whether the application of a rule based on the
protective principle can be regarded as crucial by a state
for the safeguarding of its public interest in the sense of
Art. 7 Rome Convention/Art. 9 Rome I. In Unamar,
the CJEU does not distinguish between ‘private’ and
‘public interests’ but speaks about ‘an interest judged to
be essential by the Member State concerned’.30 Since
the request of the Belgian court for a preliminary ruling
in this case did not address the question of whether
21. Kuipers, above n. 11, at 145.
22. See Bundesgerichtshof 19 March 1997 (Case VIII ZR 316/96).
23. For a detailed analysis, see Kuipers, above n. 11, at 125-33 (France) and
161-68 (United Kingdom).
24. L. Strikwerda, Inleiding tot het Nederlandse Internationaal Privaatrecht
(2012), at 67.
25. See Hauser, above n. 20, at 9-11.
26. See P. Stone, EU Private International Law (2010), at 343.
27. Cour de Cassation 19 October 1999, Bull. 281, at 183.
28. See, with references, Kuipers, above n. 11, at 154.
29. Hoge Raad 24 February 2012, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2012/274.
30. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 50.
rules based on the protective principle fall within the
scope of Art. 9 Rome I, one could argue that the CJEU
was not given the opportunity to clarify this issue.31
In my opinion, however, in Unamar the Court at least
confirmed implicitly that a rule aimed primarily at the
protection of a weaker party could be viewed as an over-
riding mandatory rule.32 Considerations based on the
importance of the Agency Directive for the proper func-
tioning of the internal market, which was emphasised by
the Court in its Ingmar v. Eaton decision,33 were not
applicable in the Unamar case, since the lex causae was
the law of a Member State, which had correctly trans-
posed the Agency Directive. Still, the CJEU allows a
court of a Member State to apply its own national provi-
sions pursuant to Art. 7 of the Rome Convention, which
are based on the Directive but offer greater protection to
commercial agents, on the condition that the legislature
adopted this provision to protect a fundamental
interest.34 It is difficult to imagine that the Court could
reach the same conclusion and simultaneously reject the
idea that national provisions based on the protective
principle and not aimed explicitly at the protection of a
state interest could be qualified as overriding mandatory
rules. Finally, it should be recalled that the European
legislature incorporated consumer protection in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights35 and that the CJEU
had already acknowledged that consumer protection, as
well as the social protection of workers, involved a pub-
lic interest.36
2.4 Origin of the Overriding Mandatory Rule
In keeping with Art. 7 of its predecessor, the Rome
Convention, Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation distin-
guishes between overriding mandatory rules of the law
of the forum and of a third country. Art. 7(2) states that
the Regulation does not restrict the application of over-
riding mandatory rules of the lex fori. In contrast,
Art. 7(3) determines that the application of overriding
mandatory provisions of a third country is narrowed
down to situations in which the provision belongs to the
law of the country of performance of the contractual
obligation, and the provision renders the performance of
the contract unlawful. The application of overriding
mandatory rules of a third country was one of the most
controversial issues under the Rome Convention and in
the negotiations on Rome I.37 However, given the rela-
tive unimportance of these overriding mandatory rules
31. J.J. Kuipers and J. Vlek, ‘Het Hof van Justitie en de bescherming van de
handelsagent: Over voorrangsregels, dwingende bepalingen en open-
bare orde’, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 198, at 203 (2014).
32. Lüttringhaus, above n. 16, at 148.
33. Case C-381/98 [2000] ECR I, at 9305, Rec. 24. See also below, Section
4.2.
34. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 50.
35. OJ 2010 C 83/389. Art. 38 reads: ‘Union policies shall ensure a high
level of consumer protection.’
36. See Plender and Wilderspin, above n. 13, at 339-40.
37. For an in-depth analysis, see Kuipers, above n. 11, at 78-92. Especially
in the German literature, the topic is met by great interest, see, amongst
others, L. Günther, Die Anwendbarkeit ausländischer Eingriffsnormen
im Lichte der Rom I- und Rom II-Verordnungen (2011); Hauser, above
n. 20, at 168-320.
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in practice,38 this issue will not be part of the following
analysis.
Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation pays no attention to
overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae.39 Some
commentators argue that these provisions should be
applied in any case, since there are no objections arising
from the principles of party autonomy and legal certain-
ty.40 According to Bisping, ‘every overriding mandatory
provision is also a (simple) mandatory provision’.41 This
view, however, conflicts with the fact that overriding
mandatory provisions determine their own application.
This means that they can be considered not only appli-
cable irrespective of the law applicable to the contract
but also inapplicable. An example of this can be found in
the aforementioned Nuon/Olbrych case, in which the
Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a choice of law clause
in an employment agreement for Dutch law does not
automatically lead to the application of Art. 6 of the
Dutch Labour Relations Decree.42 This means that a
court has to refuse the application of an overriding man-
datory rule if the rule itself does not require application,
even if it belongs to both the lex causae and the lex fori.
3 Relation to Special COL
Rules
3.1 Protective Provisions for Consumers and
Employees
Even if one interprets the Unamar judgement as
recognition by the CJEU that national rules based on
the protective principle can be qualified as overriding
mandatory provisions, this does not necessarily imply
that the same is true of rules aimed at protecting con-
sumers or employees. Unlike for agency contracts, the
Rome I Regulation contains special protective COL
rules for consumer contracts and employment contracts.
Art. 6(1) contains the objective COL rule for consumer
contracts and connects to the law of the country where
the consumer has his habitual residence. However, in
line with Art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation and with
Art. 17 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Rome I Reg-
ulation adopts a narrow definition of the concept of
‘consumer’. Art. 6(1) lays down a list of requirements.
38. See C. Bisping, ‘Consumer Protection and Overriding Mandatory Rules
in the Rome I Regulation’, European Consumer Protection: Theory and
Practice (2012) 239, at 244; A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit
van werknemers: Een onderzoek naar de interactie tussen arbeidsrecht,
EG-recht, en IPR aan de hand van de detacheringsrichtlijn (2000), at
80.
39. See W.H. Roth, ‘Savigny, Eingriffsnormen und die Rom I-Verordnung’,
Festschrift für Gunther Kühne zum 70. Geburtstag (2009) 859, at 870;
O. Remien, ‘Variationen zum Thema Eingriffsnormen nach Art. 9 Rom
I-VO und Art. 16 Rom II-VO unter Berücksichtigung neuerer Recht-
sprechung zu Art. 7 Römer Übereinkommen’, Grenzen überwinden,
Prinzipien bewahren: Festschrift für Bernd von Hoffmann zum 70.
Geburtstag am 28. Dezember 2011 (2011) 335, at 341.
40. Kuipers, above n. 11, at 79.
41. Bisping, above n. 38, at 252.
42. Nuon, above n. 29.
The contract has to be concluded by a natural person for
a purpose of private use (the consumer) with a profes-
sional that should pursue his commercial or professional
activities in the country where the consumer has his
habitual residence or, by any means, direct such activi-
ties to the country where the consumer has his habitual
residence, or several countries, including the country of
the consumer’s seat. Consequently, for the purposes of
Art. 6(1), ‘mobile’ consumers, who move across borders
on their own initiative and conclude a contract with a
professional seated abroad that does not pursue any
activities in or directs activities to the country of the
consumer, are not protected. Furthermore, Art. 6(1)
determines that the contract should fall within the scope
of the commercial or professional activities. However,
with regard to Art. 15(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation,
which contains the same phrase, the CJEU has ruled
that a causal link between the means used to direct the
commercial or professional activity to the Member State
of the consumer’s domicile is not required.43 Art. 6(4)
lists several contracts that can fall within the scope of
paragraph (1) but for which the special protective rules
of Arts. 6(1) and 6(2) do not apply, such as contracts
relating to a right in rem in immovable property and to
contracts of carriage (except for package travel con-
tracts). For most consumer contracts falling outside the
scope of Art. 6, the applicable law has to be determined
on the grounds that the general objective COL rule of
Art. 4 applies.44 This means that – in the absence of a
choice of law – the law applicable to the contract is typi-
cally the law of the country where the seller or the serv-
ice provider has his habitual residence.45
Art. 8(2) provides the objective COL rule for individual
employment contracts, stating that the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country in which or from
which the employee habitually carries or carried out his
work. To identify this place, the whole duration of the
employment relationship should be taken into
account.46 If it is not possible to determine the place
where the employee habitually works, the contract shall
be governed by the law of the country of the place of
business through which the employee was engaged
(Art. 8[3]). In contrast to Art. 6, Art. 8(4) contains an
escape clause for the law of the country that has a clos-
er47 connection with the contract.
In addition to an objective COL rule favouring the
weaker party, Arts. 6(2) and 8(1) provide protection by
narrowing down the free choice of law. Both provisions
permit a choice of law in accordance with the general
requirements incorporated in Art. 3 of the Regulation.
However, they also determine that the chosen law will
43. Case C-218/12, Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic (not yet published
in ECR).
44. For contracts of carriage, the special rule of Art. 5 applies.
45. See Art. 4(1) and (2). However, if the contract is manifestly more close-
ly connected to the law of another country, the law of that other coun-
try will apply; see Art. 4(3).
46. Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services Ltd., [2002]
ECR I, at 2013.
47. Unlike Art. 4(5), it does not require a ‘manifestly closer connection’.
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not apply insofar as it grants the consumer/employee
less protection than the mandatory rules of the law
applicable under the objective COL rule. Consequently,
a choice of law will not deprive the consumer/employee
of the protection he receives on the basis of the manda-
tory provisions of the law of the country where he has
his habitual residence/habitually carries out his work.
How should one interpret these provisions? It could be
argued that they result in a ‘purely substantive choice of
law’, without resorting to COL rules. The chosen law
will then only displace the default rules that would oth-
erwise apply. However, a more obvious interpretation
− which also reflects the majority opinion in the litera-
ture − is that a national court should apply the law that
offers the highest level of protection to the consumer or
employee, irrespective of whether that is the chosen law
or the law that applies according to the objective COL
rule.48 The consequence of this interpretation, which is
called the ‘preferential law’ approach,49 is that the court
will have to identify the mandatory provisions that offer
protection of the law of the consumer’s habitual resi-
dence/place where the employee habitually carries out
his work and compare those to the provisions of the
chosen law. Therefore, this approach is more labour
intensive than the ‘substantive choice of law’
approach.50 At the same time, it provides the weaker
party to the contract with the highest level of
protection.51 While the preferential law approach does
not deprive the parties of the opportunity to choose the
applicable law altogether,52 it does give the stronger par-
ty an incentive not to include a choice of law clause in
the contract.53 As a result, this approach manages to
find a balance between party autonomy on the one hand
and weaker party protection on the other.
48. F. Ragno, ‘The Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts under the Rome
I Regulation’, in F. Ferrari and S. Leible (eds.), Rome I Regulation: The
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (2009) 129, at
152; P. Mankowski, ‘Employment Contracts under Article 8 of the
Rome I Regulation’, in F. Ferrari and S. Leible (eds.), Rome I Regulation:
The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (2009) 171,
at 211.
49. G. Rühl, ‘Consumer Protection in Choice of Law’, 44 Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal 570, at 591 (2011).
50. J. Hill, ‘Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing’,
Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 437, at 443 (2009).
51. However, Kuipers doubts whether this is in conformity with the ration-
ale behind Art. 6(2). He argues that the objective of this provision is to
protect the consumer from the negative effects of a choice of law; how-
ever, the article is not aimed at increasing the level of consumer protec-
tion. An alternative option would be for the professional party to be
given the opportunity to annul the choice of law and opt for applying
the law of the consumer’s habitual residence; see Kuipers, above n. 11,
at 104.
52. In the Rome I proposal, party autonomy for consumer contracts was
eliminated for efficiency reasons; see COM (2005) 650, at 6-7 and O.
Lando and P.A. Nielsen, ‘The Rome I Proposal’, Journal of Private Inter-
national Law 29, at 39-40 (2007). This proposed solution was, howev-
er, subject to heavy criticism and was therefore not included in the final
Regulation.
53. Mankowski, above n. 48, at 212.
3.2 Residual Role of Overriding Mandatory
Rules
Some commentators claim that Arts. 6(2) and 9(2) of the
Rome I Regulation deal with rules of the same genus
and that Art. 6(2) − as the lex specialis − must be given
precedence, leaving no room to invoke Art. 9 for the
application of provisions whose aim is to protect the
consumer.54 After all, the European legislature did
choose explicitly not to grant special protection to
mobile consumers, to avoid the risk of ‘unfair surprise’
to the seller,55 and not to overly restrict party autonomy.
However, one could claim that rules that fall outside the
scope of Arts. 6 and 8 can still be enforced through the
safety valve offered by Art. 9. For instance, Art. 6:247 of
the Dutch Civil Code requires that the Dutch
provisions regarding unfair contract terms be applied
irrespective of the lex causae if the consumer has his
habitual residence in the Netherlands. Supposing that
the Dutch legislature had qualified these protective
rules as overriding mandatory rules,56 this would mean
that a Dutch court could apply these provisions irre-
spective of a choice of law for the law of another state,
even if the agreement had not been concluded under the
circumstances specified in Art. 6(1) or belonged to the
contracts specified in Art. 6(4). This way, Art. 9 would
continue to play a role, be it more residual.57 In my
opinion, a mobile consumer, who does not already
receive protection on the basis of Art. 6, should at least
enjoy the protection offered by Art. 9 if the state in
question has a fundamental interest in the application of
the protective rule. This thought is also in line with the
Rome I Green Paper, which states that the special pro-
vision regarding consumer contracts ‘does not interfere
with the possible application of overriding mandatory
rules’,58 since they are a different matter.59
However, if the consumer already receives protection on
the basis of Art. 6, Art. 9(2) will not apply. Suppose that
the consumer has his habitual residence in Member
State A, and the contract does not include a choice of
law. Pursuant to Art. 6(1), the law of Member State A
will be applied to the contract. If the suit is brought
before the courts of Member State B and the law of
Member State B provides a higher level of protection
than the law of Member State A, a possible conflict
between Arts. 6 and 9(2) arises. However, it is unlikely
that the court of Member State B would want to apply
the consumer protection provisions of the lex fori as
overriding mandatory provisions, since the consumer
does not have his habitual residence in this Member
State. Member State B will not have an essential interest
54. See Bisping, above n. 38, at 252; Stone, above n. 26, at 354; Köhler,
above n. 20, at 143.
55. See Stone, above n. 26, at 352.
56. See M.V. Polak in his case note on Hoge Raad 24 February 2012,
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2012/274.
57. Kuipers, above n. 11, at 106.
58. Green Paper, COM(2002)654 final, at 34.
59. See also Plender and Wilderspin, above n. 13, at 354. They also point
to the fact that the opening words of Art. 9(2), ‘Nothing in this Regula-
tion shall restrict…’, do not suggest this article is subordinate to Arts. 6
and 8.
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in protecting consumers that reside outside its territory.
This has also been confirmed by the Court of Justice in
Alpine Investments v. Ministerie van Financiën.60
4 Relation to Localising Rules
in Directives
4.1 The Concept of Localising Rules
The Greek-American scholar Symeon Symeonides dis-
tinguishes between four types of rules designed to pro-
tect the forum state’s interests and values: 1) localising
rules, which are contained in substantive statutes and
expressly demarcate the spatial scope of a specific stat-
ute; 2) overriding mandatory rules, which do not
expressly delineate the spatial reach of a statute but have
the same effect as localising rules; 3) unilateral COL
rules in PIL codifications; and 4) multilateral rules
designed to result in the application of the lex fori.61
The rules belonging to the first three categories are
examples of real unilateralism, since they lead to the
application of the lex fori and exclude foreign law. The
main difference between the first and second category is
that localising rules expressly determine the applicabili-
ty of a statute in an international situation and displace a
COL rule ‘without the need to determine whether the
provision reflects an important public interest’.62 Nev-
ertheless, in order for the provision to qualify as an
overriding mandatory rule, the forum should establish
whether it embodies an important public interest.63
Symeonides defines localising rules as being more spe-
cific and therefore overriding the COL rules.64
Localising rules can be found in several European
Directives that aim to protect weaker parties, such as the
one on distance contracting, which declares: ‘Member
States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the
consumer does not lose the protection granted by this
Directive, by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-
member country as the law applicable to the contract if
the latter has close connection with the territory of one
60. Case C-384/93 [1995] ECR I, at 1141. In Rec. 43, the Court of Justice
states that ‘the protection of consumers in the other Member States is
not, as such, a matter for the Netherlands authorities’. Kuipers, above n.
11, at 108, points out that, although a Member State may have no
interest in the protection of foreign consumers, this does not rule out
the possibility that it has another interest in the application of the same
provision, such as safeguarding the integrity of its financial market.
61. S.C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World (2014),
at 294.
62. Ibid., at 300.
63. Ibid., at 300.
64. Ibid., at 295.
or more Member States’.65 Another example is Art. 3(1)
of the Posted Workers Directive,66 which states that the
Member States have to ensure the protection of posted
workers in their territory, irrespective of the law
applicable to the employment relationship. The level of
protection provided by these Directives therefore is
guaranteed and does not depend on the COL rules of
the Rome I Regulation, including Art. 9 Rome I.67 The
localising rules in the Directives are usually viewed as
‘provisions of Community law which, in relation to par-
ticular matters, lay down COL rules relating to contrac-
tual obligations’ in the sense of Art. 23 of the Rome I
Regulation, which states that these provisions prevail
over the Regulation.68
However, Recital 58 of the new Consumer Rights
Directive69 provides that if the law applicable to the
consumer contract is that of a third country, the Rome I
Regulation should be applied to determine whether the
consumer enjoys protection on the basis of the Direc-
tive. Hence, unlike many of the ‘old style’ consumer-
related Directives, the Consumer Rights Directive does
not include a localising rule, and therefore Art. 23 of the
Rome I Regulation does not come into play. Neverthe-
less, it remains unclear as to whether application via Art.
9 Rome I has been made completely impossible. Does
the fact that the Consumer Rights Directive refers the
matter to Rome I imply that a Member State cannot
determine that a national provision transposing the
Directive protects an interest fundamental to the Mem-
ber State concerned? The CJEU will have the last word
in this, but bearing in mind the discretionary leeway for
65. See Art. 12(2) of Directive 97/7/EC, OJ 1997 L 144/19. Another exam-
ple of a localising rule is Art. 12(2) of Directive 2008/122/EC, OJ 2009
L33/10 (Timeshare Directive), which reads: ‘Where the applicable law is
that of a third country, consumers shall not be deprived of the protec-
tion granted by this Directive, as implemented in the Member State of
the forum if: any of the immovable properties concerned is situated
within the territory of a Member State, or, in the case of a contract not
directly related to immovable property, the trader pursues commercial
or professional activities in a Member State or, by any means, directs
such activities to a Member State and the contract falls within the scope
of such activities.’ Contra: Kuipers, above n. 11, at 212, who argues
that the Timeshare Directive confirms the central role of the Rome I
Regulation.
66. Directive 96/71/EC, OJ 1997 L 18/1.
67. Recital 34 of the Rome I Regulation states that Art. 8 of the Regulation
should not prejudice the application of the overriding mandatory provi-
sions of the country to which a worker is posted in accordance with the
Posted Workers Directive. However, in my opinion, Art. 3(1) of that
Directive should be seen as a localising rule, and should be considered
in the context of Art. 23 and not of Art. 9. See also Plender and Wilder-
spin, above n. 13, at 331, who argue that ‘the Directive lays down an
entirely separate and supplementary conflict rule for the benefit of the
employee’. This is also in line with the Commission’s proposal for Rome
I, which mentioned this Directive as an instrument containing a COL
rule within the meaning of what is now Art. 23; see COM2005(650)
final, at 23. Kuipers, above n. 11, at 237-38, however, argues that the
applicability of the provisions of the Posted Workers Directive should be
decided on the basis of Art. 9 Rome I.
68. Stone, above n. 26, at 293-94; Ragno, above n. 48, at 159.
69. Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ 2011 L 304/64. This one replaces Directive
97/7/EC on distance contracting as well as Directive 85/577/EEC on
doorstep selling; in addition, it amends Directive 1999/44/EC on con-
sumer sales and guarantees, and Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in
consumer contracts.
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the Member States, it cannot be ruled out that the
answer will be in the negative.
4.2 Agency Directive: Overriding Mandatory
Rules or Localising Rule?
In Ingmar v. Eaton,70 the question arose as to whether
the English court should apply its national law based on
the European Agency Directive in an international case
if the agent was active in the United Kingdom, irrespec-
tive of a choice of law clause for Californian law and of
the fact that the principal was established in California.
According to the Court of Justice, Arts. 17 and 18 of the
Directive, as implemented in English law, have a man-
datory nature.71 The Court explains that the purpose of
the provisions is ‘to protect, for all commercial agents,
freedom of establishment and the operation of undistor-
ted competition in the internal market’.72 For this rea-
son, parties cannot deviate from these provisions by
including a choice of law clause in the agency contract.73
The Ingmar case was not decided on the basis of the
Rome Convention, since at that time the Court of Jus-
tice did not have the competence to interpret the provi-
sions of this convention. Moreover, at the time of the
contract’s conclusion, the United Kingdom was not a
party to this convention. Hence, it was unclear how this
ruling should be interpreted in the light of the conven-
tion and its successor, the Rome I Regulation. Did the
Court of Justice establish an independent principle for
application of the Agency Directive?74 Did the Court
mean to qualify the mentioned provisions of the Direc-
tive as ‘overriding mandatory rules’ in the sense of Art.
7 of the Rome Convention and Art. 9 of the Rome I
Regulation? Should an agency contract be regarded as
an employment contract, and do the protective COL
rules for employment contracts apply equally?75 Or does
the wording of Art. 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation
– determining that in situations where all relevant ele-
ments are located on EU territory, a choice of law for
the law of a non-Member State shall not prejudice the
application of mandatory EU rules – imply that Ingmar,
in which there was a connection with a third country, is
no longer valid?76
In Unamar, the CJEU has clarified that the question of
whether a national court may reject the application of
the chosen law in favour of national law transposing
Arts. 17 and 18 of the Agency Directive should be con-
sidered in the context of Art. 7 of the Rome Conven-
70. See above, n. 33.
71. Ibid., Rec. 22.
72. Ibid., Rec. 24.
73. Ibid., Rec. 26.
74. See H. Heiss, ‘Party Autonomy’, in F. Ferrari and S. Leible (eds.), Rome I
Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe
(2009) 1, at 8.
75. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 41.
76. See Plender and Wilderspin, above n. 13, at 163-64. The legislative his-
tory of Art. 3(4) of Rome I shows that the Commission Proposal COM
(2005) 650 final did not restrict the application of EU mandatory law to
purely EU cases. Art. 3(5) of the Proposal stated: ‘Where the parties
choose the law of a non-member State, that choice shall be without
prejudice to the application of such mandatory rules of Community law
as are applicable to the case.’
tion.77 In my opinion, however, this does not mean that
the articles of the Agency Directive themselves are to be
considered as overriding mandatory rules.78 With regard
to the application of the Directive’s minimum harmo-
nising provisions, there appears to be no discretionary
power. Their mandatory application follows from the
Directive’s aim – to define a reasonable level of protec-
tion for commercial agents in the course of the creation
of the single market.79 Nevertheless, another question
concerns whether the national legislature may qualify its
own legislation transposing Arts. 17 and 18 of the
Directive as overriding mandatory rules and apply them
instead of the law chosen by the parties.80 With regard
to this issue, the CJEU refers to Art. 7 of the Rome
Convention, according to which a certain margin of
appreciation exists. In the event that the lex causae is the
law of another Member State that has transposed the
Directive in a correct manner, Member States are by no
means obliged by the European legislature or the CJEU
to qualify their own national provisions as overriding
mandatory rules. In other words, there are limitations to
the discretionary leeway for the Member States to quali-
fy a national provision as an overriding mandatory pro-
vision in the sense of Art. 9,81 but they are free not to
qualify a national provision as such.
In my view, Ingmar should be interpreted as establish-
ing a localising rule, which indicates the spatial reach of
Arts. 17 and 18 of the Agency Directive and which pre-
vails over the provisions of the Rome I Regulation pur-
suant to Art. 23 of the Regulation. It should be noted
that Symeonides emphasises that localising rules are
express provisions contained in statutes.82 However, the
rule laid down by the CJEU in these judgements
– namely, that Arts. 17 and 18 have to be applied where
the situation is closely connected with the EU, especial-
ly where the commercial agent carries on his activity in a
Member State, irrespective of the law chosen by the
parties83 – is unambiguous and can therefore be classed
as an implicit localising rule.84
This interpretation is in line with the idea that overrid-
ing mandatory rules are rules of national law and that
the question of whether a rule is adopted to protect an
interest regarded as essential by the Member State con-
cerned is to be decided on the national level,85 not by
the Court of Justice. Ingmar shows that the Court – in
77. See Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 41. Similar: Lüttringhaus, above n. 16,
at 148.
78. Contra: Kuipers and Vlek, above n. 31, at 201-02.
79. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 39 and 40.
80. Ibid., Rec. 41.
81. See above, Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
82. Symeonides, above n. 61, at 294.
83. Ingmar, above n. 33, at 25.
84. See, in a similar sense, Stone, above n. 26, at 294 and W.H. Roth, ‘Case
C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.’, Com-
mon Market Law Review 369, at 375-76 (2002). Also see M. Bogdan,
‘The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions and the Choice of Law by the Parties’, Nederlands Internationaal
Privaatrecht 407, at 410 (2009), stating that it possible to argue that
restriction on party autonomy established in Ingmar falls within the
scope of Art. 23 Rome I.
85. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 50.
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the absence of an explicit localising rule – can determine
the spatial reach of EU secondary legislation in interna-
tional cases. Within that reach, the courts of a Member
State will have to guarantee the level of protection pro-
vided by the European instrument, without having to
establish whether the provision was adopted to protect
an essential public interest for that Member State.86
5 Relation to Minimum
Harmonisation and Gold-
Plating
Another issue addressed in the Unamar judgement con-
cerns deviations between laws of Member States trans-
posing the Agency Directive as a result of the minimum
harmonising nature of the Directive. In the previous
section, it was argued that a Member State is obliged to
guarantee the protection level provided by the Agency
Directive in international situations in accordance with
its localising rule. But what happens in an intra-EU sit-
uation, in which parties have chosen the law of a
Member State to be applicable to their contract? It is
clear that in such a situation – provided that the
Member State has transposed the Directive in a correct
way – the minimum protection provided by the Direc-
tive is ensured. However, the question arises as to
whether the forum can still apply those provisions of its
own law that exceed the level of protection given by the
lex causae. This question is also relevant outside of the
scope of the Agency Directive, since more Directives
are based on the principle of minimum harmonisation.
Until recently, the starting point of most consumer-
related Directives was that Member States could
provide a higher level of protection. Although the
Consumer Rights Directive is based on the principle of
full harmonisation, the minimum harmonisation clauses
of the previous consumer-related directives, replaced or
amended by the new Directive, will still remain relevant
for a considerable time, since the provisions of the latter
apply only to contracts concluded after 13 June 2014.87
With regard to minimum harmonisation, three types of
discretionary leeway can be distinguished.88 First, the
Member State can choose to gradually exceed the level
of protection offered by the Directive – also known as
‘gold-plating’. Second, the Member State can decide to
extend the scope of application of the provisions of the
Directive. Third, a Directive can provide several
86. It must be noted, however, that Unamar falls within the temporal scope
of the Rome Convention, and it is not entirely clear whether the Court
would decide the same under the Rome I Regulation, also taking into
account the wording in Art. 3(4) (giving precedence only to European
mandatory law over a choice of law for the law of non-Member State in
purely intra-EU cases). However, in my opinion, Art. 3(4) does not
overrule the Ingmar decision. If the Court had been of the view that
Art. 3(4) Rome I did have an impact on Ingmar, it would probably have
hinted at this in Unamar in an obiter dictum.
87. See Art. 28(2) of the Consumer Rights Directive.
88. See Remien, above n. 39, at 339.
options from which the Member State can choose. In its
Unamar judgment, the CJEU ruled with regard to the
second type. When transposing the Agency Directive
into Belgium law, the Belgium legislature chose to
broaden the scope and to apply the provisions not only
to agency contracts for the sale or purchase of goods but
also to agency contracts for the operation of a shipping
service. The Bulgarian legislature had expanded the
scope equally. However, the level of protection afforded
by Belgian law was higher than that of Bulgarian law,
which was the law chosen by the parties. The Court of
Justice concluded that the fact that the Agency Direc-
tive was correctly transposed in Bulgarian law did not
automatically bar the Belgian court from qualifying its
own law as an overriding mandatory provision in the
sense of Art. 7 of the Rome Convention (Art. 9 of the
Rome I Regulation).
It has been argued that the Unamar case does not pro-
vide information on how to deal with ‘gold-plating’ sit-
uations, since it concerns a type of agency contract that
is not covered by the Agency Directive. Lüttringhaus
claims that in cases that fall under the scope of the
Directive and in which the Member State chooses to
‘gradually transgress’ the level of protection of the
Directive, the national court should not be given the
opportunity to apply a national provision on the basis of
Art. 9(2) instead of the law of the Member State chosen
by the parties to govern their contract. This would be
against the principle of party autonomy, as well as in
conflict with the ideal of decisional harmony within the
EU.89 However, the CJEU does not seem to exempt
national provisions that gradually exceed the level of
minimum harmonisation of the Directive from the
scope of Art. 9(2). After all, the Court distinguishes
between ‘extending the scope of a Directive’ and ‘choos-
ing to make wider use of the discretion afforded by that
Directive’ but does not differentiate between their con-
sequences.90 Therefore, in my opinion, the CJEU allows
a national court to qualify a national rule − based on a
minimum harmonisation Directive, but gradually
transgressing the level of protection − as an overriding
mandatory rule, if the legislature adopted it in order to
protect an interest considered essential by that Member
State. This is so, even if the applicable law is that of a
Member State that has transposed the Directive correct-
ly.
That is not to say that the CJEU’s solution follows man-
datorily from the provisions of the Rome Convention,
Rome I Regulation, and EU law. A more limited inter-
pretation would have been imaginable, since it concerns
a rule with a European origin. For instance, the CJEU
could also have placed some concrete limitations91 to the
concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ and deci-
ded that the application of gold-plated articles of the lex
fori − rather than the lex causae of a Member State that
has transposed the provisions of the Directive correct-
89. See Lüttringhaus, above n. 16, at 150.
90. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 50.
91. See in a similar sense Roth (2009), above n. 39, at 869.
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ly – could not be justified and should be omitted. This
interpretation would have been more in line with the
principle of party autonomy and predictability of out-
comes and would also further the harmonising effect of
the Directive.
Although the CJEU insists that the concept of ‘overrid-
ing mandatory rule’ should be – in light of the principle
of the freedom of contract – interpreted strictly,92 the
Court actually opens space for judicial activism. If the
Member State considers it of fundamental interest to
provide extra protection of the law of the forum, it is to
a great extent free to qualify its own gold-plated articles
as overriding mandatory rules, which supersede the lex
causae, even if that law guarantees the minimum level of
protection. The court will, however, only apply its own
provisions as overriding mandatory rules if they offer a
higher level of protection than the law applicable to the
contract; it is hard to imagine that the Belgian court in
Unamar would have wanted to apply its national law if
the agent had received more protection on the basis of
Bulgarian law. Therefore, the CJEU de facto permits
the adoption of a preferential law approach. However,
there is a difference with the preferential law approach
under Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation on the one hand
and with Arts. 6 and 8 on the other. According to the
latter provisions, the court has a duty to apply the most
protective rule, whereas with regard to Art. 9(2), the
European legislature allows a court to apply an overrid-
ing mandatory rule of the lex fori instead of the lex cau-
sae.93
6 Conclusions
Although the CJEU in Unamar ruled that the applica-
tion of overriding mandatory rules restricts party
autonomy and should therefore be interpreted narrowly,
it also leaves considerable discretionary leeway to the
Member States. The Court performs only a marginal
review, from which one cannot expect too much.94 In
fact, it opens the possibility for a national court to apply
as overriding mandatory provisions national protective
rules implementing an EU Directive but exceeding its
minimum level of protection, even if the lex causae is the
law of another Member State that has correctly trans-
posed the Directive. From the point of view of predicta-
bility of outcomes and the goal of decisional harmony,
this ruling is questionable. Moreover, Unamar arguably
creates an imbalance between weaker party protection
and the main cornerstone of the Rome I Regulation,
namely, party autonomy.
This problem is partly solved by European Directives
based on the principle of full harmonisation, such as the
Consumer Rights Directive, since gold-plating is no
longer allowed. However, the question remains as to
whether national provisions transposing the Consumer
92. Unamar, above n. 14, Rec. 49.
93. Plender and Wilderspin, above n. 13, at 354.
94. Remien, above n. 39, at 335.
Rights Directive can be qualified as overriding mandato-
ry rules if the chosen law is the law of a non-Member
State. Considering the discretionary leeway given to the
Member States in Unamar, it is possible that the
CJEU’s answer will be in the affirmative. However, the
different nature of the Consumer Rights Directive in
comparison to the Agency Directive, which was the
point of focus in Unamar, should not be overlooked.
The latter Directive leaves significant discretion to the
Member States when they are transposing it to national
legislation. This fact could still be seen as an argument
to let Member States determine whether the national
provisions based on the Directive should be qualified as
overriding mandatory rules. Nevertheless, the Consum-
er Rights Directive does not leave a margin of apprecia-
tion with regard to its implementation into national law,
which the European legislature justifies by stressing that
it greatly increases legal certainty for consumers and
businesses.95 As a consequence, there should also be no
discretion as to whether the provisions, as transposed in
national law, can be qualified as overriding mandatory
rules.
The articles and recitals of the Consumer Rights Direc-
tive provide a strong argument that the answer to this
question should be in the negative. After all, the Direc-
tive does not contain a localising rule, indicating that the
level of protection given by the Directive should be
guaranteed in the case of a choice of law for the law of a
non-Member State. Instead, it refers explicitly to the
Rome I Regulation to determine whether the consumer,
in the event that the lex causae is the law of a non-
Member State, retains the protection provided by the
Directive.96 From this, one could deduce that the Direc-
tive’s provisions were also not intended as overriding
mandatory rules in the sense of Art. 9 Rome I.97 The
result of this interpretation is that not all consumers
residing in a Member State are entitled to the level of
protection provided by the Consumer Rights Directive
if the lex causae is the law of a non-Member State. How-
ever, consumers that fall within the scope of Art. 6 of
the Rome I Regulation, and that are habitually resident
in a Member State, remain fully protected. Moreover,
Art. 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation guarantees protec-
tion to all consumers in purely intra-EU situations. By
depriving national courts of their margin of appreciation
to qualify their national rules with regard to transposing
a full harmonisation Directive − such as the Consumer
Rights Directive − as overriding mandatory provisions,
the CJEU would strike a balance between party autono-
my and the protection of weaker parties. At the same
time, the Court would be fully adhering to the purpose
of the Directive to ensure a high level of legal certainty.
95. See Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ 2011 L 304/64, Rec. 7.
96. See above, Section 4.1.
97. Plender and Wilderspin, above n. 13, at 261.
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